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Faculty and Deans

The Invisible Pillar of Gideon
ADAM M. GERSHOWITZ ∗
In 1996, the State of South Carolina charged Larry McVay with common-law
robbery. McVay, who was employed part-time and took home less than $160 per week
after taxes, claimed that after paying his basic living expenses he had no money left
with which to hire an attorney. A South Carolina court disagreed and denied McVay’s
request for appointed counsel. 1 Seven years later, Scott Peterson was arrested for the
murder of his wife and unborn child in California. Although Peterson owned a home,
drove an expensive SUV, and was carrying $10,000 in cash when he was captured, he
claimed to be indigent. The State of California agreed and appointed counsel for him. 2
The rationale underlying the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Gideon v.
Wainwright was that in order for every defendant to stand equal before the law, the
poor man charged with a crime must be provided with a lawyer to assist him. 3 Yet
despite Gideon’s pronouncement, the seemingly middle-class Peterson was appointed
counsel, while the nearly penniless McVay was left to fend for himself. As Gideon
celebrates its fortieth birthday, this Article confronts the question of what it means to
be indigent in our federalist system and whether the Supreme Court could establish a
framework for defining indigency that would equalize the right to appointed counsel
across the fifty states.
Gideon v. Wainwright turned forty recently. Described as “an icon of criminal
procedure,” 4 the Supreme Court’s landmark decision held that indigent defendants
accused of a felony have a “fundamental and essential” right to appointed counsel. 5 In
subsequent years, the Court has put substantial meat on the bones of its pronouncement
in Gideon. During the Warren and Burger eras, the Court extended the indigent’s right
to appointed counsel to, inter alia, direct appeals that exist as a matter of right, 6
misdemeanor cases, 7 and pre-trial proceedings. 8 In the Rehnquist era, the Court has,
for the most part, ceased the expansion of criminal procedure rights, 9 including the

*

Associate, Covington & Burling. This article benefited tremendously from the
assistance and comments of Michelle Morris and from conversations with Charles Borden. All
errors remain my own.
1. See United States v. McVay, 32 Fed. Appx. 661 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that
McVay’s uncounseled conviction could make him eligible to be a career offender under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
2. Kimberly Edds, Peterson Pleads Not Guilty; Calif. Man’s Wife, Unborn Son Killed,
WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 2003, at A3.
3. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
4. Tracey L. Meares, What’s Wrong with Gideon, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 215, 215 (2003).
5. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
6. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
7. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S.
367 (1979) (holding that the right to appointed counsel does not extend to misdemeanor cases
unless the defendant is actually sentenced to jail).
8. See, e.g., Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); White v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 59 (1963).
9. Most observers believe that the predicted conservative “counter-revolution” has not
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right to counsel. 10 For instance, the Court has adopted a nearly impenetrable test for
ineffective assistance of counsel 11 and it has refused to extend the right to appointed
counsel to collateral appeals. 12 While scholars may argue about whether the Court has
extended the right to appointed counsel too far or not far enough, the conventional
wisdom is that, like it or not, after forty years the major questions about an indigent’s
right to appointed counsel have been answered. This Article challenges that
assumption by contending that a central aspect of the indigent’s right to appointed
counsel remains undefined. While it is axiomatic that the poor are entitled to a free
lawyer, there is virtually no legal authority or scholarly commentary specifying how
poor a defendant must be to qualify as indigent.
In the forty years since Gideon was decided, there has not been a single Supreme
Court case defining what makes a criminal defendant poor enough to be entitled to
appointed counsel. Lower federal courts have only confronted the issue on rare
occasions, and then only tangentially. In the absence of any Sixth Amendment case
law, it has fallen predominately to state legislatures and state supreme court rules
committees to define indigency. The standards adopted by the states vary widely; some
have adopted specific guideposts such as the federal poverty guidelines, while others
rely on vague standards that offer little guidance and leave trial judges with broad
discretion. The result of these wide variations is that Gideon means something
different in Alabama than it does in Florida. A defendant poor enough to be entitled to
appointed counsel in one state might not have received a lawyer if he had committed
his crime on the other side of the border.
The initial response to the observation that indigency definitions vary by state might
be “so what.” Our federalist system extols states as laboratories of experimentation 13
in fact occurred in the criminal procedure arena. For instance, two noted constitutional law
scholars assert that the Court has “simply carried on the work of its predecessors.” See Jack M.
Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045,
1056 (2001). Carol Steiker offers the more nuanced view that the Rehnquist Court has
“accepted to a significant extent the Warren Court’s definitions of constitutional ‘rights’ while
waging counter-revolutionary war against the Warren Court’s constitutional ‘remedies’ of
evidentiary exclusion and its federal review and reversal of convictions.” Carol S. Steiker,
Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94
MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2470 (1996); see also Stephen F. Smith, The Rehnquist Court and
Criminal Procedure, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1337, 1360 (2002) (“Disfavored Warren Court
doctrines were altered through case-by-case adjudication so that they no longer threatened what
Rehnquist and his ‘law and order’ colleagues regarded as ‘legitimate law enforcement.’”).
10. But see Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002) (holding that a suspended
sentence that may end in the actual deprivation of a defendant’s liberty may not be imposed
without appointed counsel). See generally The Supreme Court, 2001 Term—Leading Cases:
Right to Appointed Counsel for Suspended Sentences, 116 HARV. L. REV. 200, 252–62 (2002).
11. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that a petitioner
must show counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency resulted in prejudice);
see also Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993) (applying the Strickland test).
12. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) (holding that there is no right to
appointed counsel in collateral appeals); see also Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989)
(holding that capital petitioners have no right to appointed counsel in collateral appeals).
13. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“The states may perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various
solutions where the best solution is far from clear.”); see also New State Ice Co. v. Liebman,
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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and therefore, the argument goes, if one state defines indigency more broadly than
another, so be it. However, if states had unfettered authority to define indigency, they
could determine that virtually no one is poor enough to be entitled to appointed
counsel. This would eviscerate Gideon by creating a situation in which there is a right
to appointed counsel but no one is poor enough to take advantage of that right. Thus,
in order for Gideon to remain viable, there must be a constitutional floor for the
definition of indigency. In other words, a constitutional minimum definition of
indigency is the invisible pillar of Gideon. To date, however, there is no recognized
floor.
Part I.A of this Article briefly reviews the evolution of the indigent’s right to
counsel, demonstrating that in numerous Sixth Amendment decisions the Supreme
Court has never squarely confronted the definition of indigency. Part I.B then offers
multiple explanations for the Court’s failure to take up the indigency question. Part II
then describes how states have filled the void left by the federal courts. Part II.B traces
the indigency frameworks adopted by the fifty states and demonstrates how the rules or
standards used to define indigency vary widely by state. Part III then seeks to
demonstrate that some of the variations among the states are not commendable
examples of federalism. Rather, the definitions of indigency adopted in certain states
are so narrow as to eviscerate Gideon’s guarantee of appointed counsel.
Finally, Part IV considers multiple options for eliminating the varying and
sometimes inadequate definitions of indigency adopted by the states. Part IV begins by
analyzing the emerging trend of systemic challenges to states’ entire indigent defense
systems. While there are many benefits to this structural reform litigation, state-bystate lawsuits will not succeed in establishing a constitutional floor for the definition of
indigency. As such, Part IV turns next to Congress and considers whether it has the
institutional ability to eliminate the variations through national legislation, much like it
has promulgated federal entitlement programs for welfare and poverty benefits.
Drawing on political process theory, I explain the unlikelihood that Congress would
enact such legislation. Moreover, Part IV considers the possibility that any legislative
attempt to define the scope of a constitutional right might be held unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court.
Given Congress’ inability to solve the problem, I turn last to the Supreme Court of
the United States. Part IV argues that because the Supreme Court often has difficulty
with fact-bound inquiries, it should draw on fact finding conducted by federal agencies
in other poverty-related contexts in order to create a constitutional floor for the
definition of indigency.
I. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL
A. A Brief Overview of the Development of the Right to Counsel14
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” 15 Notably,
the word “indigent” appears nowhere in the text of the Sixth Amendment, nor does the

14. For a more detailed examination of the development of the right to counsel see
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 11 (4th ed. 1999).
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Amendment explicitly specify that the government will provide counsel to those who
are impoverished or indigent. Nevertheless, it did not take the Supreme Court long to
determine that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the appointment of counsel to the
indigent. In 1930, the Court observed in dicta that “[t]he man now charged with crime
is furnished the most complete opportunity for making his defense . . . if he be poor, he
may have counsel furnished him by the state.” 16
During the first half of the twentieth century, the key Sixth Amendment question
was whether the right to counsel should be applied to state defendants. The early
answer to this question was in the negative. In Powell v. Alabama, 17 the Court held
that
in a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is
incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeblemindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or
not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law . . . . 18

Yet the Court stressed the unusual facts of the case and strongly suggested that, in
ordinary circumstances, indigent state defendants would not be entitled to appointed
counsel. Ten years later, in Betts v. Brady, the Court explicitly held that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not apply the Sixth Amendment to the states and therefore that state
defendants were not guaranteed a right to counsel. 19
In Gideon, the Court reversed Betts and held that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel applies to state defendants. Justice Black explained that
The right of one charged with [a] crime to counsel may not be deemed
fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours . . . .
This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face
his accusers without a lawyer to assist him. 20

In Douglas v. California, decided the same day as Gideon, the Court extended the
right to appointed counsel to initial direct appeals that exist as a matter of right. 21 The
Court utilized sweeping language, remarking that “there can be no equal justice where
the kind of an appeal a man enjoys ‘depends on the amount of money he has.’” 22
However, in neither Gideon nor Douglas did the Court attempt to define what it means
to be indigent.
The following year, in Hardy v. United States, the Court held that an indigent
defendant was entitled to a free copy of the trial transcript for his appeal. 23 In a
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
16. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 308 (1930). The Court reaffirmed this
principle eight years later in the landmark decision of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938),
where it held that counsel must be appointed to all federal defendants who cannot afford it,
unless they intelligently waive the right.
17. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
18. Id. at 71.
19. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
20. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
21. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
22. Id. at 355 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956)).
23. 375 U.S. 277 (1964).
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concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg penned a short footnote that attempted to explain
indigency:
Indigence “must be conceived as a relative concept. An impoverished accused is
not necessarily one totally devoid of means.” An accused must be deemed
indigent when “at any stage of the proceedings [his] lack of means . . .
substantially inhibits or prevents the proper assertion of a [particular] right or a
claim of right.” Indigence must be defined with reference to the particular right
asserted. Thus, the fact that a defendant may be able to muster enough resources,
of his own or of a friend or relative, to obtain bail does not in itself establish his
nonindigence for the purpose of purchasing a complete trial transcript or retaining
a lawyer. 24

In the forty years since Hardy was decided, no member of the Court has ever cited
Justice Goldberg’s attempt to define indigency. Rather, the status of indigency has
been assumed without explanation. 25
For instance, following Gideon, the Court contemplated at what stage of criminal
proceedings an indigent becomes entitled to counsel. Initially, the Court began with the
proposition that counsel was required at any “critical stage of the prosecution,” 26 and
held that an indigent’s right to appointed counsel applies at interrogations, 27
preliminary hearings, 28 and pre-trial lineups. 29 Ultimately, the Court adopted a brightline test in which the right to counsel attaches with the initiation of formal
proceedings. 30 Yet, in none of these decisions did the Court address whether or why
the petitioner was in fact indigent.
With respect to the right to appellate counsel announced in Douglas, the Court has
since made clear that an appointed lawyer in a first appeal as of right must be
effective, 31 but has refused to extend the post-trial right to appointed counsel much
further. In a series of decisions, the Court held that indigents are not entitled to counsel
for discretionary direct appeals, 32 collateral appeals, 33 or probation-revocation

24. Id. at 289 n.7 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT ON
POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 8 (1963)) (omission and
alterations in original).
25. For instance, in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 26 (1972), which extended the
right to appointed counsel to misdemeanor defendants, Justice Douglas began his opinion with
“[p]etitioner, an indigent,” but offered no explanation why Argersinger was indigent.
26. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–37 (1967).
27. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205–06 (1964).
28. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963).
29. Wade, 388 U.S. at 218.
30. See Pamela S. Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal Representation: The
Changing Vision of the Right to Counsel, 105 HARV. L. REV. 670, 674 n.16 (1992); see also
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (holding that pre-indictment lineups are not critical stages
that carry a right to counsel).
31. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
32. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
33. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987); see also Murray v. Giarratano, 492
U.S. 1 (1989) (no right to counsel in death-penalty appeals).
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proceedings. 34 Moreover, in recent years, the Court has devoted considerable attention
to the meaning of “effective assistance of counsel.” 35 In the landmark case of
Strickland v. Washington, 36 and numerous subsequent decisions, 37 the Court has
addressed claims of deficient performance by counsel and prejudice to the defendant
(and almost universally rejected such challenges). 38
In these decisions, and dozens of others, the Court has fleshed out the meaning of
an indigent defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel. Yet, despite the
vast number of cases addressing an indigent’s right to counsel, the Court has never
considered or set forth a definition of indigency, thus leaving the matter entirely to the
states. 39
B. Why Has the Court Never Defined Indigency?
It is impossible to know for certain why the Court has never defined indigency.
However, there are at least four plausible explanations: (1) there is no need for such a
definition; (2) the population of effected defendants has little interest in contesting the
issue; (3) the institutional actors most likely to litigate the issue have a disincentive to
do so; and (4) the Court has relied on the fact-bound nature of indigency as a reason to
defer to trial courts. Although only the latter argument is convincing, I address them all
in turn.
1. The States Have Done a Fine Job
The simplest explanation why the Court has never defined indigency is that the
states have done a perfectly fine job handling that task, and no potentially indigent

34. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) (holding that counsel will be
“both undesirable and constitutionally unnecessary in most revocation hearings, [but] there will
remain certain cases in which fundamental fairness . . . will require that the State provide at its
expense counsel for indigent probationers or parolees”). Recently, the Court rejected the
argument that Gagnon entitled Alabama to impose a suspended sentence on an indigent
defendant without the benefit of appointed counsel. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654
(2002).
35. See, e.g., William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s Tin Horn: Doctrinal and
Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91 (1995).
36. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
37. See, e.g., Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776
(1987); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986).
38. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex
Ante Parity Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 284 (1997) (“Under Strickland,
ineffective assistance is easily alleged but almost impossible to prove.”). But see Wiggins v.
Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel).
39. See Craig Peyton Gaumer & Paul R. Griffith, Presumed Indigent: The Effect of
Bankruptcy on a Debtor’s Sixth Amendment Right to Criminal Defense Counsel, 62 UMKC L.
REV. 277, 286 (1993) (“To date, however, the Supreme Court has not established a bright-line
test of indigence to be used in determining whether a defendant is sufficiently destitute to
warrant court-appointed counsel.”); see also Douglas McCollam, The Ghost of Gideon, THE
AM. LAW., Mar. 2003, at 63, 64 (“[T]o this day the Court has offered remarkably little guidance
on how the states should organize representation of the poor.”).
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defendants have been denied the right to appointed counsel. As such, there has been no
need for the Court to interfere. As explained in greater detail in Parts II and III, this
explanation is erroneous. Because some states have defined indigency very narrowly,
there is a serious question whether the rules in those states are constitutionally
deficient. Moreover, because many states have adopted vague guideposts, rather than
clear rules, for defining indigency, the Court could not be confident that trial judges in
those states had considered the correct factors or set the appropriate benchmarks for
determining indigency. As such, it does not seem plausible that the states’ “excellent”
track record in defining indigency is the reason for the Supreme Court’s lack of
involvement.
2. The Borderline Case Explanation
A second possible explanation why the Court has not set forth a minimum
definition of indigency is that the most egregious cases have already been weeded out
of the system by the time the Supreme Court gets involved. Thus, certiorari petitions
alleging denial of counsel present only borderline cases that would not raise judicial
eyebrows.
All states consider the seriousness of the offense in determining whether a
defendant is indigent. Trial courts are more likely to appoint counsel to defendants
facing the most serious charges and the longest prison terms. 40 Furthermore, all states
appoint counsel to the truly destitute, those who could be described as paupers. This
leaves what could be termed “borderline cases”: defendants who have some, but not
much, income and who are facing less serious crimes and shorter prison terms.
Defendants in borderline cases are quite likely to plea bargain, waive their rights to
appeal, and accept their (comparatively) short sentences. 41 As such, those most likely
to be denied appointed counsel do not have an incentive to challenge the denial.
There are flaws in the “borderline” explanation. First, the Supreme Court has held
that a conviction obtained in violation of the right to counsel creates a jurisdictional
defect. 42 Thus, the waiver of appellate rights might not be enforceable and the
defendant may be free to challenge the court’s conclusion that he was not indigent.
Second, even those defendants sentenced to comparatively short sentences have an
incentive to appeal their convictions. While a three-year sentence for burglary or drug
crimes might not be long in comparison to a life sentence for murder, it does provide
enough time for a case to work its way out of the state system and to the Supreme
Court. Thus, the “borderline” theory is unpersuasive.

40. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:158A-14 (West 2004) (“Need shall be measured
according to . . . an assessment of the probable and reasonable costs of providing a private
defense, based upon the status of the defendant, the nature and extent of the charges and the
likely issues.”) (emphasis added).
41. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2463, 2494, 2497 (2004) (explaining that (1) “[g]uilty defendants generally know that they
are guilty, and are aware of the likely evidence against them, so they can predict the probable
trial outcomes” and (2) ninety-five percent of criminal defendants plead guilty).
42. Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994).
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3. The Institutional Actor’s Disincentive
A third and more plausible explanation for the Court’s failure to confront the
indigency definition is that the institutional actors most likely to press the issue have
no incentive to do so. Nationwide, public defenders shoulder most of the burden of
dealing with indigent defendants. 43 Public defender offices are terribly overburdened;
in most jurisdictions they lack the funding to hire adequate staff, and each public
defender must handle far more cases than she can effectively deal with. 44 Similarly,
many jurisdictions provide indigent defense services through fixed-price contracts,
whereby a lawyer is paid a lump sum to defend all of the jurisdiction’s indigent
defendants. 45 Because public defenders and fix-priced contractors already have more
cases than they can handle, they would lack the incentive to bring a challenge to their
state’s definition of indigency. A successful challenge would result in more defendants
being classified as indigent and would create even more work for public defenders and
contractors. Already overburdened public defenders reasonably might believe that
adding more cases to their workload would further harm their representation of
existing clients. 46 Thus, the lawyers most involved with the indigent defense system
lack the incentive to challenge a state’s narrow definition of indigency.
This argument, while plausible, fails to account for other participants in the indigent
defense system, including organizations such as the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers, that work on behalf of indigent defendants. Moreover, indigent
defendants themselves are capable of challenging the government’s refusal to appoint
counsel by bringing in forma pauperus appeals. Indeed, much of the Supreme Court’s
docket consists of such in forma pauperus suits, and Gideon himself filed his appeal
without the assistance of counsel. 47 Accordingly, the institutional actor argument is
likely flawed.
4. The Fact-Finding Explanation
The most likely explanation for the Court’s failure to define indigency is that it
views indigency as a factual question that requires deference to the trial court.
Appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, tamper with trial courts’ factual
findings only when they are “clearly erroneous.” 48 The underlying rationale is that the

43. See Margaret H. Lemos, Note, Civil Challenges to the Use of Low-Bid Contracts for
Indigent Defense, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1808, 1809 n.14 (2000) (citing sources).
44. See Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of
the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 664
(1986) (“Attorneys who work in public defender offices commonly complain of an excessive
caseload which prohibits their having adequate time to prepare their cases.”).
45. Observers have criticized fixed-price contracts, particularly those that are awarded
to the lowest bidder. See, e.g., Adele Bernhard, Take Courage: What the Courts Can Do to
Improve the Delivery of Criminal Defense Services, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 293, 307 (2002) (“The
greatest problems with inadequate defense counsel are created by low-bid fixed-price contracts.
. . .”); Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal Services
to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783.
46. See Klein, supra note 44, at 664.
47. See ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET 3–7 (1964).
48. See, e.g., Lackawanna County Dist. Atty. v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 406 (2001).
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trial court, which sees the evidence first hand and can question witnesses, is in a better
position to make factual findings than an appellate court working from a paper record.
As explained infra, in Part II, the determination of indigency is a heavily fact-bound
inquiry. Courts must analyze, inter alia, a defendant’s assets, his debts, and the cost of
hiring a lawyer. Thus, the Supreme Court might see indigency solely as a factual
question that requires great deference to the trial judge. Because such factual decisions
are rarely reversed, it would make sense that the Court would not grant certiorari to a
case questioning an indigency determination. 49
II. STATES FILL THE VOID
This court has considered indigency on a case-by-case basis, as have most other
jurisdictions. 50
–Supreme Court of Arkansas

In the absence of any direction from the Supreme Court of the United States, the
determination of indigency has been left in the hands of the states. In most states, the
legislature or state supreme court has filled this gap by adopting a standard—rather
rather than a rule—for determining indigency. As scholars have long recognized, rules
are hard and fast (such as do not drive over fifty-five mph), while standards are
seemingly open-ended (such as do not drive unreasonably fast). 51 States have adopted
“standards” by providing criteria for judges to consider, without providing any hardand-fast requirements. In these states, trial judges have wide discretion to grant or deny
appointed counsel. By contrast, a handful of states have adopted rules for defining
indigency, such as providing that anyone who earns less than 125% of the poverty line
is presumptively indigent. Because such rules are more rigid and provide a
predetermined floor, judges in these states have limited discretion. Before analyzing
the differences among the states, I begin by noting those broad factors that many states
commonly consider in determining indigency.
A. Common Factors in State Definitions of Indigency
Although no two states employ exactly the same criteria, there are certain factors
that are commonly considered by states in determining indigency. 52 First and foremost,
states look to a defendant’s assets—including, but not limited to, income, savings,

49. Although the factual nature of an indigency determination may be a plausible
explanation why the Court has not defined indigency to date, that reason should not continue to
keep the Court from broaching the question. See infra Part IV.C.
50. Hill v. State, 802 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Ark. 1991).
51. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 959 (1995).
For a sampling of the scholarship on the difference (or lack thereof) between rules and
standards, see Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65
(1983); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J.
LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974).
52. According to one leading treatise, “[g]eneral agreement exists as to most elements
considered in determining whether the resources available to the defendant are sufficient to
retain counsel.” See LAFAVE, ET AL., supra note 14, § 11.2(g) at 531.
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stocks, bonds, and home ownership. 53 While the non-liquidity of a defendant’s assets
is a consideration, it is often offset by his potential borrowing power. 54 Some states
will also consider the financial resources of the defendant’s spouse and other family
members. 55 Balanced against the defendant’s assets are his basic living expenses,
debts, dependents, and other obligations. 56
In addition to the defendant’s financial status, states also take account of the
seriousness of the charged offense. 57 Because it is more expensive to hire a lawyer for
a murder charge than for a burglary charge, the presumption may be that a burglary
suspect can afford to hire counsel, but a murder suspect with similar assets cannot.
Finally, most states provide that a defendant can still be considered indigent even if
he posted bail or bond. 58 The underlying principle is that a defendant should not have
to choose between posting bond and obtaining the assistance of counsel. 59
Nevertheless, some states consider the posting of bond as a sign of additional
resources and therefore consider the bond amount in determining whether the
defendant is indigent. 60
States collect the above-described information through an affidavit of indigency
completed by the defendant. 61 On occasion, this affidavit can be supplemented or
verified through investigation, but “[b]ecause of the tremendous volume of indigency
cases, the vast majority of determinations will be based on the information furnished in
the defendant’s affidavits.” 62
Many states consider some or all of the factors described above when determining
indigency. It would be a gross over-generalization, however, to say that there is a

53. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 815.9 (West 2003) (“[T]he court shall consider not
only the person’s income, but also the availability of any assets subject to execution, including
but not limited to cash, stocks, bonds, and any other property . . . .”).
54. See, e.g., ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 39.1(c)(1) (“In assessing the defendant’s ability to
pay the likely cost of private representation through trial, the court shall consider all resources
available to the defendant, including . . . credit or borrowing ability.”).
55. See ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 6.4(a) cmt. (“In making a determination of whether or not a
defendant is indigent, the court should consider . . . other sources of family income.”).
56. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 15:147(B)(1) (West 2004) (“In determining whether
or not a person is indigent and entitled to the appointment of counsel, the court shall consider . .
. outstanding obligations, and the number and age of dependents.”); accord Hill v. State, 805
S.W.2d 651, 653 (Ark. 1991) (concluding that defendant was indigent because his student loans,
legal fees, and overdue child support exceeded his assets).
57. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-12-5(b) (2004) (“In determining indigency, the judge
shall recognize . . . the effort and skill required to gather pertinent information and the length
and complexity of the proceedings.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A: 158A-14 (West 2004) (“Need shall
be measured according to . . . an assessment of the probable and reasonable costs of providing a
defense, based upon the status of the defendant, the nature and extent of the charges and the
likely issues.”).
58. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-19.9 (repealed 2004) (“Release on bail shall not
necessarily preclude a person from being considered indigent.”); IDAHO CODE § 19-854(b)
(Michie 2004) (“Release on bail does not necessarily prevent [the defendant] from being a
needy person.”).
59. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 14, § 11.2(g) at 534 & n.265.
60. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.52 (3)(c)(1) (West 2003).
61. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 14, § 11.2(g) at 534 n.279.
62. Id. at 537.
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typical method employed by a majority of states to determine indigency. As described
below, the definitions of indigency vary widely by states and most are quite vague.
B. Classifying State Definitions of Indigency
1. States with No Guideposts and Unfettered Discretion
Numerous states have failed to adopt any guideposts or intelligible standards for
determining who is indigent. Rather, they have promulgated statutes or rules that
contain empty words stating only that an indigent is someone too poor to pay for
counsel. As such, trial judges in these states appear to have unfettered discretion not
only in the final decision whether a defendant is indigent, but also in determining what
factors should be considered in assessing indigency.
Arkansas is a typical example. The Arkansas Code provides only that “[i]ndigent
person” means “a person who, at the time his need is determined, is without sufficient
funds or assets to employ an attorney or afford other necessary expenses incidental
thereto.” 63 This definition provides no guidance as to whether the trial judge should
consider the severity of the offense, whether the defendant posted bail, the assets of the
defendant’s estranged wife, or countless other factors.
North Carolina’s definition of indigency is similarly vague. The North Carolina
General Statutes and the North Carolina Rules both state that “[a]n indigent person is a
person who is financially unable to secure legal representation and to provide all other
necessary expenses of representation.” 64 The commentary to the North Carolina Rules
explains that one must look to North Carolina case law to find indigency criteria, but
that even the cases “do not establish a precise measure of indigency.” 65 Recognizing
the deficiency, the commentary states that the North Carolina’s Office of Indigent
Defense Services “is working on developing more detailed standards and expanding
the basic statutory definition of indigency.” 66
Over a dozen other states have vague definitions of indigency that offer no
guidance on whether particular defendants are indigent. 67 In these states, trial judges
have nearly unfettered discretion to choose the factors to be weighed and to make the

63. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-87-201(3) (Michie 2003).
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-450 (2004); N.C. INDIGENT DEFENSE SVCS. R. § 1.4 (2004).
65. N.C. INDIGENT DEFENSE SVCS. § 1.4 cmt. (a) (2004) (explaining that the cases
“direct that various factors, such as the person’s employment, income, and assets be weighed in
determining whether a person is indigent.”).
66. Id.
67. See CAL. CODE 27706 (a) (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29 § 4602 (2004); 725
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/113-3 (West 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-9-11-1 (repealed 2004); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 211D, § 2 (West 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-8-111 (2004); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 29-301–29-303 (Michie 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. §171.188 (Michie 2004); N.Y. 18A §§
716–721; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §23A-40-6 (Michie 2004); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 802-4
(2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 151.485 (2003); PUERTO RICO STAT. § 428 (2003); 16 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 9960.6 (2002); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. 44 (2004); COLO. R. CRIM. PRO. 44(a) (West 2003); CONN.
SUPER. Ct. R. § 37-6(a) (2003); N.D. R. CRIM. PRO. 44 (providing for a commission that will
adopt guidelines for criteria for eligibility of counsel to indigents); see also State v. Mickle, 525
P.2d 1108 (Haw. 1974) (recognizing that since the Hawaii legislature failed to adopt any
guideposts for the determination of indigency, the court promulgated a detailed standard).
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ultimate decision whether a defendant is indigent. Furthermore, some state appellate
courts have determined that a trial judge’s indigency determination is reviewed only
for an abuse of discretion. 68 Under this highly deferential standard, the trial judge’s
decision will not be rigorously reviewed and it seldom will be reversed. 69
2. States with Vague Standards and Wide Discretion
A number of states have moved beyond platitudes and adopted general, but vague,
guideposts for assessing whether defendants are indigent. These vague criteria leave
trial judges with wide discretion to determine who can and cannot afford a lawyer. For
instance, the Alabama Code provides:
In determining indigency, the judge shall recognize ability to pay as a variable
depending on the nature, extent, and liquidity of assets, the disposable net income
of the defendant, the nature of the offense, the effort and skill required to gather
pertinent information and the length and complexity of the proceedings. 70

The Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure expand this indigency definition to
require that “the court should consider such factors as the defendant’s income, sources
of income, and sources of income of other members of the family; property owned;
outstanding obligations; and the number and ages of any dependents.” 71 These
guideposts, while identifiable, leave trial judges with wide discretion. For instance, if a
defendant earned only $150 per week and had no other assets or debts, the Alabama
statute would offer no guidance about whether he should be considered indigent.
Almost two dozen states have adopted similar criteria that provide trial judges with
some guidance but nevertheless afford them wide discretion to make indigency
determinations. 72 In these states, like those that offer no criteria whatsoever, it is

68. Initially, it makes sense that an indigency determination would be reviewed for
abuse of discretion because it appears to be a mixed question of law and fact—the facts being
the defendant’s assets and debts. However, in certain circumstances—such as when a state has
failed to adopt any guideposts for determining indigency—a colorable argument can be made
that the indigency determination must be subject to de novo review. As discussed in Part IV, for
Gideon v. Wainwright to have any meaning, there must be a constitutional floor for defining
indigency. The question of whether a state has fallen below that floor could be seen as a pure
question of law that merits de novo review. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently held that
punitive damages awards are subject to de novo review even though they arguably could be
seen as involving factual determinations. See Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532
U.S. 424 (2001).
69. See Mark P. Painter & Paula L. Welker, Abuse of Discretion: What Should it Mean
Under Ohio Law, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 209, 219 (2002) (quoting authorities on rarity of abuse
of discretion reversals); see also Jon O. Newman, A Study of Appellate Reversals, 58 BROOK. L.
REV. 629, 639 (1992) (stating with regard to the “clearly erroneous” standard that “this study
indicates how infrequently a district judge’s finding of fact is deemed clearly erroneous”).
70. ALA. CODE § 15-12-5 (2004).
71. ALA. R. CRIM. PRO. 6.3 cmt.
72. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-19.9 (2004); IDAHO CODE § 19-854(b) (Michie 2004);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.120 (Michie 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15: 147(B)(1) (West
2004); MD. CODE ANN. , [Public Defender] 27A §7 (2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-32-9(1)
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impossible to discern from the statutes whether Gideon’s mandate is being carried out.
Trial judges could be using their wide discretion to broadly provide appointed counsel,
or they could be using that discretion to process cases through the system quickly by
declining to appoint counsel in questionable circumstances.
3. States with Rules and Low Discretion
A few states have gone beyond vague criteria to adopt specific guideposts for
determining whether defendants are indigent. The detailed rules adopted by these
states are:
Alaska: A defendant is presumed to be indigent if (1) he receives public
assistance, such as food stamps or Medicaid; (2) he was found to be indigent
within the last 12 months; or (3) his gross annual income is less than the adjusted
federal poverty guidelines for his household size and his other assets are less than
half of the amount necessary to hire a lawyer. 73
Florida: A defendant is indigent if his income is “equal to or below 200 percent of
the then-current federal poverty guidelines . . . or if the person is receiving
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, poverty-related veterans’ benefits, or
Supplemental Security Income (SSI).” 74
Iowa: A defendant is indigent if he “has an income level at or below one hundred
twenty-five percent of the United States poverty level.” 75

(2004); MO. REV. STAT. §600.086 (West 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 158A-14 (2004); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §31-16-5 (Michie 2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 120.05 (West 2004); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 12-15-8 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-14-202(2) (2004); W. VA. CODE § 29-21-16
(Michie 2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604-A: 2-c (2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4504 (2003);
WIS. STAT. ANN. §977.07(2) (West 2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-6-106 (Michie 2003); ARIZ. R.
CRIM. P. 6.4 cmt.; ME. R. CRIM. P. 44(b); MICH. R. CRIM. P. 6.005(B); TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN.
art. 26.04(m).
73. See ALASKA R. CRIM. PRO. 39.1(f).
74. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.52(3)(b)(1) (West 2003); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. §
27.52(3)(c)(1)–(3) (West 2003).
[T]he existence of any such fact creates a presumption that the applicant is not
indigent: (1) defendant has been released on bail in the amount of $5,000 or more
(2) the defendant owns, or has equity in, any intangible or tangible personal
property or real property or the expectancy of an interest in any such property or
(3) the defendant retained private counsel immediately before or after filing
affidavit asserting indigence.
If the second factor were interpreted literally, a defendant who owned any personal property –
even the shirt on his back – would be presumed not indigent. It is unlikely that this was the
Florida Legislature’s intent.
75. IOWA CODE § 815.9(a) (West 2003); see also IOWA CODE § 815.9(b) (2003) (A
defendant with an income level between 125%, but below 200% of the poverty guidelines “shall
not be entitled to an attorney appointed by the court, unless the court makes a written finding
that not appointing counsel on the pending case would cause the person substantial hardship.”)
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Minnesota: A defendant is indigent if he or a dependent residing in his household
“receives means-tested governmental benefits.” 76
South Carolina: A defendant is presumed to be indigent if his “net family income
is less than or equal to the [Federal] Poverty Guidelines . . . . Net income shall
mean gross income minus deductions required by law.” 77
Utah: A defendant is indigent if he “has an income level at or below 150% of the
United States poverty level.” 78
Vermont: A defendant is presumed to be indigent if (1) he is “receiving any kind
of welfare aid which constitutes a major portion of subsistence” or (2) his “gross
income is at or 150% below the poverty income guidelines for nonfarm families
established under the Community Services Act of 1974.” 79
Virginia: A defendant is indigent “if his available funds are equal to or below 125
percent of the federal poverty income guidelines.” 80
Washington: A defendant is indigent if he receives public assistance—such as
food stamps, Medicaid, or supplemental security income—or his annual income
after taxes is less than or equal to 125% of the federal poverty guidelines. 81

A quick glance at these statutes demonstrates that the definitions of indigency vary
widely by states. For instance, a defendant with an income level at 150% of the federal
poverty guidelines would be entitled to appointed counsel in Utah, but not Iowa or
Washington.
An individual earning twice the federal poverty guidelines would be entitled to
counsel if he were arrested in Florida. However, if the defendant were charged on the
Alabama side of the border there would be no way to know whether he would be
entitled to appointed counsel because Alabama’s vague standard for indigency leaves
trial judges with wide discretion. 82 In one Alabama courtroom, a defendant with an
income level that was 200% of the poverty guidelines might be considered indigent,
while in another Alabama courtroom the defendant might be denied appointed counsel.
In sum, the meaning of indigency—and the guarantee of the right to appointed
counsel—varies widely by state and even within the states themselves.

76. MINN. R. CRIM. PRO. 5.02 subd. 3.
77. S.C. APP. CT. R. 602(b)(3).
78. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-202(3)(ii) (2004).
79. VT. R. CIV. PRO. 3.1(b)(1).
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-159(3) (Michie 2004). In exceptional circumstances,
Virginia courts will appoint counsel if the defendant’s available funds exceed 125% of the
federal poverty guidelines. Id.
81. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.101.010(1)(a) & (c) (West 2004).
82. See ALA. CODE § 15-12-5 (2004).
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III. THE ABSENCE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL FLOOR AND THE EVISCERATION OF
GIDEON
A. Gideon’s Unrecognized Constitutional Floor
Our federalist system encourages states to act as laboratories of experimentation.
Certain states forbid drivers from making a right turn on red. Other states have
abolished the sales tax. Urban states impose strict gun laws, while rural states renounce
them. The freedom to experiment allows states to place higher values on certain
favored behavior, while placing more significant restrictions on disfavored behavior. 83
Experimentation thrives in the criminal law area. Using a cell phone while driving
is unlawful in certain jurisdictions. 84 Virginia punishes ex-felons in possession of a
firearm more severely than other states. 85 Thirty-eight states authorize the use of
capital punishment, while a dozen states forbid executions. 86 The list of examples is
seemingly endless. 87
Yet clearly there are constitutional limits on the scope of experimentation. 88
Virginia is free to punish ex-felons for possessing firearms, but the State cannot
interrogate them on the whereabouts of the guns in violation of their Miranda rights. 89
Oklahoma is entitled to utilize the death penalty, but it may not execute children under
the age of sixteen. 90 Put simply, the Constitution acts as a floor that limits certain state
experimentation. 91
The idea of a constitutional floor applies with equal force to the right to appointed
counsel. In Gideon and its progeny, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment
guarantees the right of appointed counsel to indigent criminal defendants. As a result,
after Gideon, states were no longer free to experiment with the idea of not assigning
counsel to indigent defendants. It would make no sense if states were able to covertly
flout Gideon’s mandate by defining indigency so narrowly as to eliminate the right to
appointed counsel. In other words, if states had free reign to adopt any definition of

83. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.”).
84. See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. § 1225-c (McKinney 2001).
85. See Tom Jackman, Virginia Jurists Denounce Mandatory Sentences; Felons With
Guns Get No Breaks, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1999, at B1.
86. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 342 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
87. But see Stephen Chippendale, Note, More Harm Than Good: Assessing
Federalization of Criminal Law, 79 MINN. L. REV. 455 (1994) (discussing the proliferation of
federal statutes targeting intrastate crime and the loss of states as laboratories).
88. See, e.g., Marshall J. Hartman & Jeanette Nyden, Habeas Corpus and the New
Federalism After the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 30 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 337, 340 (1997) (“As a result of the[] Warren Court decisions, the notion that there
were ‘fifty laboratories’ to experiment with the rights of defendants died . . . .”).
89. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
90. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
91. See, e.g., Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787 (1999)
(discussing the concept of a constitutional floor and advocating such a floor in the search and
seizure area).

586

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 80:571

indigency that they wished, they could effectively abolish the indigent’s right to
appointed counsel by defining indigency so narrowly that no one would qualify.
Take the following (exaggerated) example: Faced with budget shortfalls, a
Midwestern state (“Midwestern”) recognizes that 80% of its criminal defendants
receive appointed counsel, at great cost to the state. 92 Midwestern determines that it
could save millions of dollars by simply defining indigency so narrowly that only a
handful of criminal defendants would qualify for appointed counsel. As such,
Midwestern passes a law defining an indigent defendant as someone who earns less
than seventy-five dollars per month, approximately 10% of the federal poverty
guidelines. 93 Midwestern contends that it is complying with Gideon’s mandate because
it is still appointing counsel to indigent defendants.
Although, the Midwestern example is obviously exaggerated, it nevertheless
illustrates why there must be a constitutional floor on the definition of indigency for
Gideon to have any meaning. Without such a floor, states could define away the right
to appointed counsel. And there is a colorable argument that some states—perhaps
unintentionally—have done just that.
B. Falling Below the Floor
It is not an easy task to produce evidence that states—in the absence of a specified
constitutional floor—have defined indigency so narrowly as to eviscerate Gideon.
When trial judges rule that defendants are not indigent, they usually rule from the
bench without reducing their decisions to writing. Arguably indigent defendants who
are denied counsel often plead guilty, waive their appellate rights, and never again
raise the question of whether they should have been appointed counsel. 94 Thus, a large
number of potentially indigent defendants never press their claim through the judicial
system, and the evidence of possible denials of the right to appointed counsel are lost
forever.
Because there is no central database containing the financial information of those
who have been denied appointed counsel, the evidence instead must come from state
statutes defining indigency and a handful of court decisions denying the appointment
of counsel. Let us begin with the statutes.
1. Unduly Narrow Statutory Definitions of Indigency
As discussed in Part II, most states have adopted vague guideposts for defining
indigency, making it difficult to know whether indigent defendants are being denied
appointed counsel in these states. Nine states, however, have adopted clear rules for

92. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Fee Shifting in Criminal Cases, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
583 (1995) (“Estimates of the percentage of criminal defendants represented by appointed
counsel . . . generally hover around seventy-five to eighty percent.”).
93. The poverty level for a single individual in 2003 was $8,980. Annual Update of the
HHS Poverty Guidelines, 68 Fed. Reg. 26, 6456-58 (Dep’t of Health and Human Serv. Feb. 7,
2003), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/03fedreg.pdf [hereinafter “Annual Update”].
94. But see supra text accompanying note 42 regarding the non-waiver of jurisdictional
defects, particularly the right to counsel.
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defining indigency by relying on the federal poverty guidelines or federal entitlement
programs. It is these rules that demonstrate the evisceration of Gideon.
a. The Realities of 125% of the Poverty Guidelines
In Virginia, 95 a defendant is indigent if “his available funds are equal to or below
125% of the federal poverty guidelines.” 96 In exceptional circumstances, Virginia
courts will appoint counsel if the defendant’s funds exceed 125% of the poverty
guidelines, 97 but in the ordinary case a defendant at 126% of the poverty level is
expected to retain counsel with his own funds. In 2003, the poverty level for a single
individual was $8,980. 98 In theory, this sum represents the minimum amount of money
that an individual needs for basic subsistence. 99 By setting the definition for indigency
at 125% of the poverty guidelines, Virginia requires anyone making in excess of
$11,225 per year to retain private counsel. By way of example, an individual who
works forty hours per week, fifty-two weeks per year, at $5.50 per hour would earn
$11,440, too much to be appointed counsel. 100
Can a worker earning 126% of the poverty level be expected to pay for his own
lawyer? Let us assume that every dollar up to the poverty level ($8,980) is spent on
basic living expenses such as food, shelter, health care, transportation, and clothing.
After subtracting $8,980 from $11,315 (which is 126% of the federal poverty
guidelines), the criminal defendant would have, at most, $2,335 with which to hire a
lawyer. Of course, the $2,335 sum is based on the unrealistic assumptions that (1) the
defendant is arrested after earning his very last paycheck of the year and (2) that he has
saved every available penny. In reality, the defendant might have (1) been arrested in
February, before he had a chance to save any money, or (2) already spent his
discretionary income on entertainment (or squandered it on drugs).
It is doubtful that an individual earning 126% of the federal poverty level would
have any discretionary funds, no less $2,335, with which to hire a lawyer.

95. Of the nine states that have adopted clear rules for determining indigency, Virginia
has neither the narrowest nor the most expansive definition. Moreover, Virginia’s rule is nearly
identical to that employed by Iowa and Washington. Accordingly, Virginia is a representative
example. See supra text accompanying notes 73–80.
96. VA. CODE § 19.2-159(3) (Michie 2004). In exceptional circumstances, Virginia
courts will appoint counsel if the defendant’s available funds exceed 125% of the federal
poverty guidelines. See id.
97. Id.
98. See Annual Update, supra note 93, at 6457.
99. Since their inception in the 1960s, the poverty guidelines have been calculated by
multiplying an individual’s necessary food budget by three. See PATRICIA RUGGLES, DRAWING
THE LINE: ALTERNATIVE POVERTY MEASURES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 4
(1990); Gordon M. Fisher, Some Popular Beliefs About the U.S. Poverty Line as Reflected in
Inquiries from the Public, 30 THE SOCIOLOGIST 6 (1996). Because the poverty guidelines are
based on food consumption data from the 1950s, scholars believe that the present day guidelines
may be at least 50% lower than the comparable measures were in the 1960s. See RUGGLES,
supra at 167–68.
100. The federal minimum wage is $5.15 per hour. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (2000).
Working forty hours per week, fifty-two weeks per year, a minimum wage worker would earn
$10,712 and would (barely) be entitled to appointed counsel.
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Nevertheless, let us assume that a criminal defendant earning 126% of the poverty
guidelines would have half of the discretionary income ($1,168) with which to hire a
lawyer. While this small sum might be sufficient to hire a lawyer for certain low-level
misdemeanors, it would prove insufficient to retain a lawyer for a serious felony
defense.
b. Paying a Lawyer’s Up-Front Retainer
When a criminal defendant facing a felony charge and multiple years of
incarceration walks into a lawyer’s office, the lawyer will identify four possible
scenarios: (1) the defendant will be convicted at trial and incarcerated, and accordingly
will lack the incentive and ability to pay his legal bills; (2) the defendant will be
acquitted at trial but, being a dishonest individual who is no longer in need of legal
help, will refuse to pay his legal bills and will “skip town”; 101 (3) the defendant will be
convicted at trial, but will recognize that it was not his attorney’s fault and will work
hard to pay his legal debts from behind bars; or (4) the defendant will be acquitted at
trial and, either being an upstanding citizen or afraid of further legal troubles, will pay
his legal bills.
While some attorneys may trust their clients to pay the bill, the overwhelming
majority of criminal defense lawyers—whether practical or jaded—will adopt a more
pessimistic view. Accordingly, it is the practice of criminal defense attorneys to charge
an up-front retainer before agreeing to represent a criminal defendant. 102 Although
retainer fees vary, a typical defense lawyer will likely demand 50% of the fee up front.
Some lawyers will actually seek 100% up front, by silently doubling their fee and
demanding immediate payment of half of the doubled fee. 103
Whether the defendant can afford the retainer fee of course depends on what the
lawyer charges to defend the particular offense. Again fee levels will vary, depending
on the seriousness of the crime, the quality of the lawyer, the geographic region of the
country, and numerous other variables. Nevertheless, we can attempt to piece together
some possible fees by multiplying typical hourly rates by the number of hours an
attorney is likely to spend on a particular case.

101. See Peter Lushing, The Rise and Fall of the Criminal Contingent Fee, 82 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 498, 514 (1991) (“Criminal clients are not inclined to pay after a losing trial,
and an acquittal, known to them as ‘justice,’ is not something for which they often feel obliged
to pay.”).
102. See United States v. McVay, 32 Fed. Appx. 661, 668 n.3 (4th Cir. 2002) (King, J.,
dissenting) (“Common sense, as well as time-honored practice, dictates that defense lawyers
procure their fees before a criminal case is concluded . . . [L]awyers must get the money ‘upfront,’ or risk not being paid at all.”).
103. As Professor Lushing has explained, “[n]ecessity is the mother of ingenuity for the
criminal practitioner, who might first silently determine his fee, then quote the client a fee twice
as large, and request that he get paid ‘one-half” up-front.’ See Lushing, supra note 101, at 515.
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c. The Average Lawyer’s Hourly Charge
The American Bar Association recommends that attorneys be paid an hourly rate of
$113 for representing indigent defendants accused of federal crimes. 104 The Criminal
Justice Act, which seeks to guaranty adequate representation to indigent defendants
charged with federal crimes, is less generous, providing for an hourly rate of up to
sixty dollars for in-court time and forty dollars for out-of-court time. 105
It stands to reason that attorneys in private practice will charge far more than the
rate paid to appointed lawyers by the government under the Criminal Justice Act. First,
private lawyers will assume that defendants who have not been designated as indigent
will have money to hire a lawyer. Indeed, defendants who are charged with a crime
and are not entitled to appointed counsel may be quite scared and will be in great need
of a paid lawyer’s services. 106 As such, most lawyers will anticipate that “nonindigent” criminal defendants are willing to pay substantial sums. Second, unlike
appointed lawyers who are paid by very reliable state or federal courts, lawyers in
traditional private practice must seek remuneration from criminal defendants, a far less
reliable group. Because of the prospect that criminal defendants will “skip town” or,
worse yet, be incarcerated after receiving the lawyer’s services, criminal defense
attorneys have an incentive to raise their hourly rates to recover more money up-front.
In other words, a lawyer who could be assured of reimbursement for all 100 hours of
work might charge eighty dollars per hour. A lawyer concerned that his client might
skip town without paying for half of the work hours might charge a rate of $160 per
hour to ensure that he recoups all of his costs. Put simply, a criminal defense lawyer in
private practice will charge more than the forty to sixty dollars per hour provided for
indigent defendants under the Criminal Justice Act.
At the same time, the hourly rate proposed by the American Bar Association for
representation of indigent federal defendants is likely to be higher than the rate
charged by some criminal defense lawyers in private practice. The ABA is an entity
that lobbies on behalf of lawyers and has an interest—undoubtedly for good reasons—
in increasing lawyers’ minimum level of compensation. While an hourly rate at $113
may be in the best interests of criminal defendants and the legal profession, it would be
questionable to assert that a criminal defendant would be unable to find a lawyer
charging below this rate. Therefore, as a realistic matter, let us assume that a defendant
seeking to hire his own counsel will not be able to find anyone to take the case at a
cost of less than ninety dollars per hour.
d. The Number of Hours per Case
In calculating the up-front retainer we must next determine how many hours the
lawyer will need to work at the ninety dollar rate. Unfortunately, there do not appear to

104. See Ralph C. Martin, Report and Recommendation, 2001 A. B. A. SEC. CRIM. JUST.
(on file with author).
105. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (2000).
106. See Pamela S. Karlan, Contingent Fees and Criminal Cases, 93 COLUM. L. REV.
595, 628 (1993) (“[D]efendants are psychologically vulnerable and may face substantial time
pressures in finding counsel who are available to represent them during the critical early stage
of the prosecution. The search costs will be even greater if a defendant is incarcerated.”).
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be any statistics on the average number of hours it takes to adequately defend
particular crimes. 107 Perhaps the reason for the dearth of guidance is that every case is
different and it is not possible to draw any bright lines about how many hours a
defense lawyer should spend on, for example, a conventional armed robbery case.
Nevertheless, I will make an educated guess for purposes of fleshing out our
hypothetical.
Imagine that a defendant is accused of robbing a victim at gunpoint, and that the
police recovered a gun from the defendant after a warrantless, and arguably
unconstitutional, search. The defense attorney should spend a number of hours
working on a motion to suppress the gun as the fruit of an unconstitutional search. She
should also, at minimum, interview the defendant, survey the crime scene, and locate
and interview witnesses. The defense attorney might then spend time negotiating a
possible plea bargain with the prosecutor. If no plea agreement were reached, the case
would proceed to trial, and the lawyer would have to select a jury, draft an opening
statement and closing argument, prepare witnesses for examination, and contemplate
the cross-examination of hostile witnesses. This, of course, is in addition to the time
actually spent in court trying the case and waiting through breaks while the judge and
jury are out of the courtroom. In sum, it is difficult to imagine an armed robbery
defense being conducted competently in less than thirty hours. In an ideal world, a
defense lawyer might spend ten times that many hours.
e. One Year’s Funds Are Insufficient To Pay the Retainer
At ninety dollars per hour, thirty hours of work would cost $2,700. If the lawyer
demanded a true 50% retainer, the defendant would have to write a check for $1,350.
If the lawyer wanted to ensure full payment, she might double her fee to $5,400 and
demand half ($2,700) up front. 108 As explained above, a defendant earning 126% of
the federal poverty guidelines (and reasonably spending half of his discretionary
income on other expenses before getting into legal trouble) would have only $1,168
remaining at the end of the year. Thus, after saving half of one year’s discretionary
income, our hypothetical defendant would not have sufficient funds to even pay the
retainer of an extremely low-priced attorney. Being too “wealthy” to receive appointed
counsel, and too poor to hire a private lawyer, this defendant would be denied access
to any counsel and would have to proceed pro se in violation of Gideon’s mandate.
1. Judicial Evisceration of Gideon: The Anecdotal Example
The National Legal Aid & Defender Association contends that “Georgia counties
routinely deny counsel to indigent defendants in non-felony cases” and that some
Wisconsin courts set the financial eligibility threshold so high that individuals eligible

107. The ABA, which admirably has advocated reasonable minimum fees and effective
representation of criminal defendants, has not recommended a minimum number of hours that
counsel should devote to particular types of cases. See Email from Shubi Deoras, Assistant
Committee Counsel for ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, to
Adam Gershowitz (Sept. 11, 2003) (stating that the ABA does not recommend the amount of
time indigent defense counsel should spend per case) (on file with the author).
108. See Lushing, supra note 101, at 515.
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for Medicaid coverage or food stamps would not be appointed counsel. 109 An example
from South Carolina demonstrates that the narrow construction of indigency adopted
by some courts is resulting in the denial of appointed counsel to the truly indigent.
In 1996, Larry Wade McVay was arrested for robbery in Lexington County, South
Carolina. 110 McVay completed an affidavit of indigency stating that his gross weekly
income was $182 per week. 111 After taxes, McVay took home about $160 per week,
and he had no other savings or sources of income. 112 McVay claimed to have a $275
monthly rent payment; $80–100 in monthly utility costs; $60–65 in weekly food
expenses; and the additional expense of paying his cousin’s car insurance in exchange
for receiving transportation to work. 113 As one judge recognized, “[a]llowing for these
basic living expenses, McVay was left with a disposable income of virtually
nothing.” 114
In 1996, South Carolina law provided that “a presumption of non-indigency is
created if the gross income of the accused exceeds $125 per week.” 115 Because he
earned $182 per week, McVay was presumed not to be indigent and the court
concluded that McVay could not overcome the presumption and therefore was not
entitled to appointed counsel.
McVay then sought to retain private counsel. The first two lawyers he approached
offered to take his case for lump sum fees of $8,000 and $10,000 respectively, with
each lawyer demanding half of the sum up-front. 116 McVay, however, did not have
$4,000. 117
Unable to retain private counsel, McVay proceeded pro se at trial, was convicted of
the robbery charge, and sentenced to prison. After his release, McVay again found
himself in trouble with the law, and he pleaded guilty to armed robbery in federal
court. Because McVay had two prior felony convictions, he was categorized as a
career offender and sentenced to 188 months imprisonment. 118 On appeal, McVay
contended that he should not have been sentenced as a career offender because he was
denied appointed counsel in connection with his 1996 burglary conviction. Although a
majority of the Fourth Circuit panel rejected McVay’s appeal, a dissenting judge
concluded that McVay was so poor that he should have been afforded appointed
counsel. The dissent observed that the inclusion of McVay’s uncounseled conviction

109. See Nat’l Legal Aid & Defender Ass’n, Gideon Reviewed: The State of the Nation
40 Years Later (2003) (on file with author).
110. See United States v. McVay, 32 Fed. Appx. 661, 664, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS
1626 (4th Cir. Feb. 1, 2002), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 933 (2002).
111. See id. McVay earned seven dollars per hour, but did not have the opportunity to
work more than twenty-seven hours per week.
112. See id. at 668 (King, J., dissenting).
113. See id. (King, J., dissenting).
114. Id. (King, J., dissenting).
115. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 602(B) (Law Co-op. 1996). South Carolina law further
provided that “[w]here the accused’s income exceeds the presumptive amount and a
presumption of non-indigency is created, but liabilities and debts exist as complicating factors, a
final determination of indigency may be made by the judge with jurisdiction over the court in
which the matter is to be heard.” Id.
116. McVay, 32 Fed. Appx. at 668 (King, J., dissenting).
117. Id. (King, J., dissenting).
118. See id. at 663.
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in the career offender calculus increased McVay’s armed robbery sentence by elevenand-a-half years. 119
The absence of a minimum definition of indigency has permitted some states to
eviscerate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel by leaving certain defendants in a
position where they are too “wealthy” to receive appointed counsel and to poor to
retain a private lawyer. For Gideon v. Wainwright and the indigent’s guarantee of
appointed counsel to have any meaning, there must be a minimum constitutional floor
for the definition of indigency.
IV. DEFINING INDIGENCY: INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
While it is apparent that many states have adopted vague and inadequate definitions
of indigency, rectifying that problem is not simple. In this Part, I examine three options
and, after exposing their theoretical and practical flaws, recommend that the Supreme
Court craft a solution based on factual findings already undertaken by Congress and
federal agencies in other poverty-related contexts.
A. Systemic Challenges To State Indigent Defense Systems
In many states, the entire indigent defense system is in crisis. 120 As one observer
describes:
Lawyers representing indigent defendants often have unmanageable caseloads that
frequently run into the hundreds, far exceeding professional guidelines. These
same lawyers typically receive compensation at the lowest end of the professional
pay scale. Stories of intoxicated, sleeping, or otherwise incompetent public
defenders are legion, such that it has become trite to lament the sometimes
shockingly incompetent quality of indigent defense counsel in America today. 121

An increasing number of scholars and criminal defense lawyers accordingly have
come to believe that retrospective appeals on behalf of individual criminal defendants
are futile both in the short and long term. 122 In response, litigators have begun leveling
systemic challenges to states’ entire indigent defense systems. For example, lawyers
have asserted that excessive public defender caseloads constitute ineffective assistance
of counsel. 123 Another approach has been to assist counties in filing civil rights actions

119. See id. at 668 n.4 (King, J., dissenting).
120. See Note, Gideon’s Promise Unfulfilled, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2062, 2063 (2000);
Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense: Promoting Effective
Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of Choice For All Criminal
Defendants, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 74–75 (1993).
121. Note, supra note 120, at 2064.
122. See Dripps, supra note 38 at 279–80; Note, supra note 120, at 2068–69.
123. See State v. Peart, 621 So.2d 780 (La. 1993) (sustaining challenge to indigent
defense system and holding that defendants would be presumed to have received ineffective
assistance of counsel until legislative action was taken); Platt v. State, 664 N.E.2d 357 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1996) (rejecting challenge to public defender system); Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1
(Minn. 1996) (same).
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against state governments to demand greater funding. 124 In other states, lawyers have
filed class action suits seeking injunctions forcing the state to increase funding for
indigent defense. 125
These systemic challenges to entire indigent defense systems are similar to the
structural reform litigation involving school desegregation and prisons. 126 If
successful, these broad-based challenges to indigent defense systems could solve
multiple problems, including excessive caseloads, underpayment of public defenders
and appointed counsel, and the unduly narrow definition of indigency utilized by that
particular state. 127 To be successful, however, systemic challenges must overcome
numerous significant obstacles.
First, courts are reluctant to find standing or a justiciable controversy in such
suits. 128 Second, the resources necessary to level a systemic challenge are
considerable, and coordinating and funding such actions in numerous states would be
extremely difficult. Third, both state and federal courts likely will be reluctant to
undertake massive structural supervision of an entire indigent defense system. The
Supreme Court, for instance, has signaled its frustration with lengthy structural reform
litigation. 129 Fourth, there are pitfalls associated with both state and federal forums.
State court judges, even in the supreme courts, are often elected and may be unwilling
to order a costly overhaul of an indigent defense system that would take money from
taxpayers’ pockets in order to benefit criminal defendants. 130 Federal courts, while less
beholden to constituents, present an unfavorable abstention doctrine that usually
results in the dismissal of the lawsuit. 131

124. See, e.g., Mississippi v. Quitman County, 807 So.2d 401 (Miss. 2001).
125. See, e.g., New York County Lawyers’ Assoc. v. State, 742 N.Y.S. 2d 16 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2002).
126. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (challenging prison system’s use of
isolation cells as an unconstitutional violation of the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (challenging
certain aspects of a school system’s desegregation plan).
127. For the argument in favor of the structural approach, see Rodger Citron, Note,
(Un)Luckey v. Miller: The Case for a Structural Injunction to Improve Indigent Defense
Services, 101 YALE L.J. 481 (1991).
128. See, e.g., Kennedy, 544 N.W.2d at 21 (concluding that ineffective assistance of
counsel challenge to public defender system was non-justiciable).
129. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 386 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he
federal judiciary is ill equipped to make these types of judgments, and the Framers never
imagined that federal judges would displace state executive officials and state legislatures in
charting state policy.”);Wendy Parker, The Supreme Court and Public Law Remedies: A Tale of
Two Kansas Cities, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 475, 548 (1999) (“The Supreme Court appears
particularly impatient with the continued presence of school desegregation cases.”).
130. See McCollam, supra note 39 (“Some attribute the state judiciary’s reluctance [to
revamp indigent defense] to the political vulnerability of elected judges who can’t afford to be
seen as ‘soft’ on crime, even if they’re sympathetic to the problems of indigent defense.”).
131. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 410 U.S. 37 (1971); Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673
(11th Cir. 1992) (detailing the Eleventh Circuit’s dismissal on abstention grounds a decision
which appeared sympathetic to a systemic challenge to Georgia’s indigent defense system);
James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention Doctrine, 46
STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1102 (1994) (noting the broadness of Younger abstention).
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Despite these formidable challenges, some systemic challenges to indigent defense
systems have been successful. For instance, in a recent class action, a New York judge
ordered more money to be spent on the indigent defense system. 132 Additionally,
litigation has resulted in favorable settlements in Pennsylvania and Connecticut (and
limited successes in Arizona, Louisiana, and Oklahoma). Nevertheless, there have also
been a substantial number of failures. 133 To date, no statewide systemic challenge has
concerned the definition of indigency and, in any event, a statewide challenge could
not result in a nationwide minimum standard for indigency.
B. The Unlikely Congressional Solution
The inadequacy of state-by-state reform efforts indicates that only a national body
can successfully promulgate a minimum definition of indigency. This leaves us with
either Congress or the Supreme Court. I begin with the former.
The question of what it means to be indigent requires fact-finding. For instance,
what is the average cost of retaining a criminal defense attorney for a robbery charge?
Do most attorneys require that a substantial portion of the fee be paid up front? Can
someone earning just above the poverty guidelines pay for rent, food, and other basic
living expenses and still have funds remaining to pay a lawyer? Congress, of course, is
well suited to undertake this fact-finding. 134 Indeed, following Gideon, Congress held
hearings on the need for effective assistance of counsel and passed the Criminal Justice
Act of 1964. 135 Congress set minimum rates for the compensation of appointed
attorneys, and it raised the rates in 1970 and 1986. 136 As such, one could posit that
Congress could determine a minimum definition of indigency and then pass legislation
(with the President’s signature or over his veto) that would implement a constitutional
floor for the definition of indigency below which none of the states could pass. There
are two problems with such a solution, however.
First, Congress is not likely to be interested in fixing the indigent defense problem.
As Abner Mikva has explained, Congress is a reactive institution that is ill-suited to
effectively dealing with abstract constitutional issues. 137 In the abstract, Congress will
not be interested in helping the criminally accused. Criminal defendants are not

132. See N.Y. County Lawyers’ Ass’n v. State, 742 N.Y.S.2d 16 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)
(raising hourly rates for appointed counsel to ninety dollars per hour).
133. See McCollam, supra note 39 (explaining that systemic challenges in Minnesota,
New Jersey, and Georgia have failed).
134. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial
Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1182 (2001) (“Congress undoubtedly has
the capacity to find social facts, while the courts face important obstacles in attempting to
engage in accurate factfinding.”). Professor Devins asserts, however, that Congress’s incentive
to take fact-finding seriously is driven by its own agenda. See id. at 1182–86.
135. The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-455, 78 Stat. 552 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2000)).
136. Id. Unfortunately, Congress did not follow through on the funding of the increased
rates. See Ronald Goldstock, Report to the House of Delegates, 1998 A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. SEC.
REP. 1.
137. Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?,
61 N.C. L. REV. 587 (1983).
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popular; to the contrary, they are the quintessential discrete and insular minority
identified by political process theorists. 138
For the past forty years, politicians have benefited from being tough on crime. 139
Beginning with Barry Goldwater, the law and order issue has been a hallmark of the
Republican Party, and has been used to tar and feather liberal Democratic
candidates. 140 By the 1990s, the Democrats realized that their support for liberal crime
policies was “a major political liability” and since then have adopted the tough on
crime position as well. 141 As such, “control of the crime issue [has become] a
necessary, though perhaps not sufficient, requirement for political victory in
America” 142 and all politicians, whether running for the first time or seeking reelection, take a tough on crime position. 143 Accordingly, scholars have observed that
criminal legislation is “almost entirely one-directional.” 144 Legislatures criminalize
more activity without taking existing laws off the books or making criminal violations
harder to prove. 145
The other relevant political reality of the past forty years has been budget
shortfalls. 146 Voters make three contradictory demands on politicians: greater
discretionary spending, lower taxes, and a balanced budget. In order to satisfy the
voters, politicians are reluctant to cut “their” programs, and instead find it easier to
reduce funding for programs utilized by nonvoters, such as felons 147 (or potential

138. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY & DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980) (setting forth a theory of judicial review in which courts should avoid substantive
policymaking and defer to the political branches except where a group has been cut off from the
political process or to protect discrete and insular minorities); Donald A. Dripps, Criminal
Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a
Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1081 (1993) (“Legislatures
undervalue the rights of the accused at both the investigatory and adjudicatory stages of the
criminal process . . . . It follows that the active judicial development of constitutional rules
governing police, prosecutors, and the criminal trial process is a legitimate exercise of judicial
review.”).
139. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do With It?: The Political, Social,
Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing Development of (Federal) Criminal
Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23, 40 (1997) (explaining that “[c]rime first became a major issue
in national politics in the 1960s.”).
140. See id. at 40–42.
141. Id. at 42.
142. Harry A. Chernoff et al., The Politics of Crime, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 527, 577
(1996).
143. See MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN
AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE 18–19 (2004) (“Given the emotive force of crime as an issue, few
public officials are willing to risk the ‘for criminals’ label.”).
144. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 558 (2001).
145. See id. Professor Stuntz offers a systemic description of how the interplay between
prosecutorial discretion and judicial deference to the legislature’s law-making power leads to a
“one-way ratchet” in which legislatures criminalize more conduct without removing laws from
the books. Id. at 509, 547.
146. See generally BOB WOODWARD, THE AGENDA (1994).
147. Nearly all states disenfranchise prisoners, and many states deny the vote to exfelons. For an overview of the state laws, see Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons,
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felons), 148 including indigent defense. Thus, at the state level, funding for public
defenders and appointed counsel is an easy target, 149 despite the dire consequences of
cutting such programs. For example, the Mississippi Supreme Court has twice noted
that the state’s indigent defense system is underfunded and twice admonished the
legislature to correct the problem, yet no improvements have been made. 150
State and federal legislators are cut from the same cloth, and it is hard to imagine
Congress being more enthusiastic about funding indigent defense services than the
state legislators who have ignored the problem to date. 151 Federal legislation providing
a minimum definition of indigency would almost certainly cost additional money.
Whether that money came from state or federal coffers, it would be an unpopular
expenditure and contrary to legislators’ interests in being re-elected. If Congress
provided extra federal funding for criminal defendants, it would anger voters. If
Congress sought to have states provide more funding for criminal defendants, it would
anger both voters and powerful state politicians. In short, the political branches of the
federal government have little incentive to fix problems associated with indigent
defense. 152
Second, even if Congress were inclined to roll up its sleeves and determine the
appropriate minimum definition of indigency to be adopted by all the states, it is
possible that the Supreme Court might find such an action unconstitutional. In recent
years, the Court has been adamant that it alone has the power to define constitutional
rights. 153 While many scholars have questioned the Court’s claim to be the exclusive

115 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1939 (2002). As Professor Karlan has recently pointed out, 1.4 million
black men were disenfranchised in the 1996 election, more than the number who were actually
enfranchised by the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870. See Pamela S. Karlan,
Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the Debate over Felon
Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1157 (2004).
148. The group most likely to find itself entangled with the criminal justice system—
young, impoverished minorities—is also least likely to vote. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
REPORTED VOTING AND REGISTRATION BY RACE, HISPANIC ORIGIN, SEX, AND AGE, FOR THE
UNITED
STATES:
NOVEMBER
2000,
available
at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/voting/p20-542.html. Legislatures therefore
can cut indigent defense programs without risking significant backlash from this group.
149. See, e.g., Kim Taylor-Thompson, Individual Actor v. Institutional Player:
Alternating Visions of the Public Defender, 84 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2448–49 (1996).
150. See McCollam, supra note 39, at 63–64.
151. See Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument
From Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 805 (2004) (“Indigent defense is widely
underfunded, and the political structures through which funding decisions are made suggest
little hope for improvement.”); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal
Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 55–56 (1997) (explaining that “[o]verall
funding for criminal defense has declined on a per case basis since the late 1970s” and that the
standard politician’s gripe is that more funding will only result in more defendants “winning on
‘technicalities’”).
152. See Note, supra note 120, at 2062 (“The political process failure in this area is
unsurprising, for indigent defendants, by definition, lack the financial and political capital
necessary to pursue effective reform efforts.”).
153. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1
(1958). For the academic endorsement of this position, see Larry Alexander & Frederick
Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997).

2005]

THE INVISIBLE PILLAR OF GIDEON

597

interpreter of the Constitution, 154 virtually no academics have stepped forward to
challenge the Court’s claim to be the ultimate arbiter of constitutional rights.155 A
similar pattern can be found in the halls of Congress. Few legislators have questioned
the Court’s status as the ultimate decisionmaker. 156 Indeed, when it comes to dealing
with unpopular areas, such as indigent defense, legislators are happy to tell their
constituents that the courts are responsible for those matters. 157
If Congress did decide to take it upon itself to bind all fifty states to a minimum
definition of indigency, it arguably would be defining the scope of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. 158 In other words, Congress, not the Court, would be

154. See MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999); Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002) (“While the
courts remained responsible for declaring the boundaries, it was recognized that the
Constitution contemplated room for the political actors to give substantive meaning within those
boundaries.”); Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 CORNELL
L. REV. 1529, 1547–48 (2000) (arguing that the power of interpretation should belong to
whichever institution—Congress or the Court—that provides the greatest protection to the Bill
of Rights); Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2001); Michael
W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111
HARV. L. REV. 153, 185–88 (1997) (arguing that that the Court should defer to Congress’s
enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment, inter alia, when “there are no judicially manageable
standards for decisionmaking . . . [and] when constitutional questions turn on empirical or
predictive judgments”).
155. See Kramer, supra note 154, at 7 (noting that of the “not insubstantial literature”
all but one scholar “defend models in which the other branches remain subservient to the
Supreme Court”). The one scholar, according to Kramer, is Michael Stokes Paulsen.
156. See Neal Devins, The Federalism-Rights Nexus: Explaining Why Senate
Democrats Tolerate Rehnquist Court Decision Making But Not the Rehnquist Court, 73 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1307, 1322 (2002) (explaining that although the Rehnquist Court has struck
down twenty-nine statutes, Congress has not expressed outrage at the Court’s actions and
accordingly there has been no call to limit the Court’s jurisdiction or otherwise “curb” the
Court).
157. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on
Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 360
(1995) (explaining that the Court’s long-term constitutional regulation of capital punishment
has legitimized it in the eyes of the public); Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic
Debilitation: Comparative Illumination of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 94 MICH. L. REV.
245 (1995) (arguing that judicial supremacy in enforcement of the Bill of Rights causes the
elected branches to defer to the courts and undermines majoritarian protection of rights).
158. This is perhaps an oversimplification. A generation ago, the Supreme Court
recognized Congress’s authority to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and
intimated that Congress could interpret constitutional provisions in a way that would expand,
but not restrict, those rights. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (setting forth
the infamous one-way ratchet theory); see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966). The Court’s recent decision in City of Boerne appears to implicitly overrule the
Katzenbach decisions. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, The Last Days of the Rehnquist Court: The
Rewards of Patience and Power, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 251, 256 (2003) (“City of Boerne was at least
implicitly a rejection of the vision of shared constitutional interpretation expressed a generation
earlier in Katzenbach v. Morgan . . . . ”). Nevertheless, as Laurence Tribe explains, prior to
Boerne the scope of Katzenbach v. Morgan had long been unclear, and matters are not
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saying what the Constitution means. Of course, if the Court agreed with the precise
contours of Congress’s definition, then a legislative exposition of that definition would
not be a problem. The rub would come if the Court believed that Congress had adopted
too broad of a definition of indigency. An aggrieved state would complain that
Congress had forced it to spend more money on indigent defense than is required by
the Sixth Amendment, and that such legislation is therefore unconstitutional. Given
that the Rehnquist Court has sided with the states and struck down approximately
thirty federal statutes, 159 the Court might be sympathetic to such a federalism
argument.
Thus, in the unlikely event that Congress were inclined to define indigency, its
definition might be overruled by the Supreme Court. Legislators still smarting from
previous overrulings might be disinclined to invite another reversal. This is particularly
true where there is no political gain to be had.
C. The Supreme Court Solution: Circumventing Fact-Finding
Because state-by-state structural reform litigation will not solve the indigency
problem, and because any congressional solution is unlikely, it falls to the Supreme
Court to set a minimum definition of indigency. It is not difficult to assert that the
Court is the appropriate body to create a minimum definition of indigency. As
explained below, political process theory easily places the indigency question into the
Court’s arena. It is, however, difficult to believe that the Court will successfully
accomplish the task on its own. The definition of indigency is a fact-bound question,
and the Supreme Court is not a fact-finding institution. 160 As such, I recommend that
the Court set a constitutional floor for indigency by drawing on facts already found by
Congress and federal agencies.
1. Why the Supreme Court?
The underlying premise of our democracy is that policy decisions should be made
by politically accountable, elected officials. Decisions made by unelected, life-tenured
judges are “countermajoritarian.” 161 The most prominent attempt to circumvent the
countermajoritarian difficulty is political process theory, and in particular the work of
John Hart Ely. 162 Ely’s theory, which has been widely criticized 163 and less widely
defended, 164 posits that the Court should embroil itself in the political process only to
necessarily more lucid in its aftermath. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 5-16, at 941 (3d ed. 2000).
159. Devins, supra note 156, at 1307.
160. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 154, at 1547–48 (arguing that “[l]imited fact-finding
ability is another weakness undermining the judicial process quality defense of judicial
supremacy in enforcing the Bill of Rights.”).
161. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). But see
Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993) (rejecting the
premise of the countermajoritarian difficulty).
162. See ELY, supra note 138.
163. The critical literature is voluminous. The best and earliest examples include Paul
Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131 (1981), and Laurence H. Tribe, The
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
164. For the best defense (at least of the process prong) see Michael J. Klarman, The
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(1) protect the political access of minority groups, and (2) invalidate legislative actions
that are designed to prejudice discrete and insular minorities. 165 Although political
process theory can be invoked in numerous fields of constitutional law, 166 it is perhaps
most at home in the criminal procedure arena. 167 As Professor Michael Klarman has
observed, “[b]ecause the political process does not adequately represent the interests of
those societal groups largely populating the criminal class, political process theory
demands judicial superintendence.” 168 Put simply, elected officials typically have little
or no interest in protecting the rights of criminal defendants. Only a “countermajoritarian” institution—the Supreme Court—can safeguard their rights.
Process theory is applicable to criminal procedure generally, and the right to
appointed counsel specifically. Because indigent criminal defendants are often
disenfranchised or do not exercise their right to vote, there is no affirmative reason for
politicians to legislate a minimum definition of indigency. 169 To the contrary, in a
world of limited resources, legislators have reason to oppose any minimum definition
of indigency based on its costs. Assuming a balanced budget, more spending on
appointed counsel means either higher taxes or less spending on politically popular
programs. No elected official realistically would favor funding the rights of criminal
defendants over the politically popular programs desired by constituents. 170 Thus,
criminal defendants are an out group and cannot expect Congress to set forth the
minimum definition of indigency that is implicitly called for by Gideon v. Wainwright.
Given that Congress is not likely to act, and that a minimum definition of indigency
is the invisible pillar of Gideon, it is proper for the Court to assert its countermajoritarian weight. Such a task will not be easy, however. While the Supreme Court
is quite good at speaking in terms of lofty constitutional principles, it is not a factfinding institution and sometimes has difficulty when its legal rulemaking depends in
part on fact-bound questions. 171

Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 766 (1991).
165. See ELY, supra note 138, at 102–03, 151.
166. See Klarman, supra note 164, at 750–63 (discussing process theory’s application
to equal protection, free speech, fundamental rights, and free exercise cases).
167. See William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 20 (1996) (“A lot of constitutional theory has been shaped by the
idea . . . that constitutional law should aim to protect groups that find it hard or impossible to
protect themselves through the political process. If ever such a group existed, the universe of
criminal suspects is it.”).
168. Klarman, supra note 164, at 766.
169. See supra Part IV.B.
170. See Note, supra note 120, at 2066 (“Prior to Gideon, indigent defense was not a
political priority and few jurisdictions had organized public defender or assigned counsel
systems on their own initiative.”).
171. For instance, while the Court has confidently declared that obscenity is not
protected speech, it has never been able to successfully define what is obscene. See GEOFFREY
R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 188 (1999) (“The first period [of obscenity
jurisprudence], which lasted from the 1957 decision in Roth until 1973, was dominated by the
Warren Court’s frustrating and largely unsuccessful efforts to define ‘obscenity.’”). Similarly,
while the Court recently ruled that it is unconstitutional to execute the mentally retarded, it was
unwilling or unable to define what it means to be mentally retarded. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002).
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2. Defining a Flexible Constitutional Floor for Indigency
Because of the difficulties the Court faces in fact-finding, it should avoid
descending into difficult factual questions. As such, the Court should adopt a flexible
constitutional floor for the definition of indigency based on the federal poverty
guidelines and the federal programs that utilize those guidelines.
a. The Case for the Federal Poverty Guidelines
Throughout this Article, I have spoken of the need to recognize a constitutional
floor—a minimum definition of indigency below which none of the states can pass.
There are at least three types of constitutional floors that could be employed in the
indigency context: (1) a rigid numerical floor that sets forth the exact income of those
who are indigent, (2) a purely qualitative standard that attempts to set guideposts
without invoking any specific numerical criteria, or (3) a flexible standard that relies
on already identified numerical indicators specified by federal agencies.
The first approach would require the Court to simply pick a magic number or
formula and hold that anyone below that number is indigent. The flaws in this
approach are obvious. How would the Court identify the magic number or derive the
formula? The Justices are not able to hold hearings on what constitutes indigency.
Moreover, they lack the expertise to select a magic number without assistance. In
short, the Court lacks the institutional ability to establish a rigid numerical floor.
The second approach—a qualitative standard—initially seems more plausible.
Constitutional law textbooks are filled with three-pronged tests, and the Court certainly
has promulgated many successful verbal formulations of constitutional rights.
However, as the Court discovered in attempting to define obscenity, certain concepts
are simply elusive. While the Justices may “know it when [they] see it,” 172 it is
unlikely that they could translate indigency into a prescribed verbal formulation that
would offer sufficient guidance to trial judges.
The third approach—a flexible standard based on already identified numerical
indicators specified by Congress and federal agencies—is more practical. This
approach provides for the Court to look to the federal poverty guidelines (an “alreadyidentified numerical indicator”) and to use those guidelines to offer a flexible
definition of indigency. 173
In the early 1960s, an economist at the Social Security Agency named Mollie
Orshansky devised a framework for measuring poverty by utilizing the generally
accepted standards for adequate food and multiplying that number by three. 174

172. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
173. As a general matter, courts do not look to social science indicators in defining the
contours of criminal procedure. For an argument that courts should consider such facts and
research in making criminal procedure decisions, see Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt,
Foreword: Transparent Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733 (2000). For a more recent treatment, see Tracey
L. Meares et al., Updating the Study of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1171 (2004) (arguing for
the consideration of social science in the criminal law arena).
174. For a more detailed explanation of Orshansky’s approach, see Gordon M. Fisher,
The Development and History of the Poverty Thresholds, 55 SOC. SEC. BULL. No. 4, Winter
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Orshansky’s poverty thresholds still serve as the primary federal poverty measure and
are updated annually by the Census Bureau. 175 The poverty thresholds are the basis for
the federal poverty guidelines, which are a simplified figure issued by the Department
of Health and Human Services and used for administering eligibility for certain federal
programs. 176 Each year the federal poverty thresholds and guidelines are adjusted to
keep pace with the Consumer Price Index. 177 In essence, the federal agencies conduct
fact-finding about poverty and translate that fact-finding into a baseline number for
administering poverty-related programs.
Rather than create its own formula out of whole cloth, the Court could draw on the
fact-finding already undertaken by these federal agencies and utilize the federal
poverty guidelines. To adopt the federal poverty guidelines is not a revolutionary idea.
A handful of states have utilized multiples of the poverty guidelines in setting their
definitions of indigency. 178
There are, of course, problems with the federal poverty guidelines. The guidelines
are based on food consumption data from the 1950s and are therefore outdated. As one
scholar explains, “[o]ver time . . . the goods people consume are likely to change
dramatically, and the definition of the minimum needed for subsistence is likely to
change as well.” 179 Thus, while only heating may have been considered essential in the
1960s, today perhaps both heating and air conditioning are seen as necessities. The
same scholar is also critical of the fact that the guidelines are based on gross income,
rather than after-tax disposable income. 180
While there is significant criticism of the poverty guidelines, the fact remains that
they are the single most common administrative measure of eligibility for povertyrelated programs. In essence, the poverty guidelines are how the federal government
determines who is poor. By adopting the poverty guidelines as the framework for
determining indigency, the Court could avoid most of the difficult factual inquiries that
are implicit in the question of what it means to be indigent. I say “most” because the
Court would still face the difficult task of determining the appropriate multiple of the
poverty guidelines to use as the constitutional floor. Nevertheless, I believe the Court
is adequately positioned to answer this question.
b. The 200% Solution
In selecting the appropriate multiple of the federal poverty guidelines, it is easiest to
begin with what the Court should not do. The guidelines announce the minimum funds
necessary for basic subsistence. In theory, an individual at 100% of the poverty
guidelines is using all of his income for food, housing, and other life necessities. It is
therefore logical to conclude that an individual at 100% of the poverty guidelines

1992, at 3, available at www.ssa.gov/history/fisheronpoverty.html.
175. See id.
176. The poverty thresholds are a statistical measure used to calculate the number of
people in poverty. The poverty guidelines are a simpler figure utilized for administering
eligibility for certain federal programs. See id.
177. RUGGLES, supra note 99, at 41.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 73–75, 77–81.
179. RUGGLES, supra note 99, at 17.
180. See id. at 136.
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would have no additional funds to pay an up-front retainer to a lawyer, and that the
minimum definition of indigency must be set higher.
Other federal programs provide similar guidance. Individuals earning 120% of the
poverty guidelines are considered special low income Medicare beneficiaries and are
excused from paying part of their Medicare premium. 181 Individuals earning up to
130% of the poverty guidelines receive food stamps because their income is presumed
to be too low to afford necessary nourishment. 182 If earning 120% or 130% of the
poverty guidelines is not sufficient to pay for health care and food, it is difficult to see
how such an income would enable an individual to pay significant up-front fees to a
lawyer.
The same logic applies at 150% and 185% of the poverty guidelines. The Low
Income Home Energy Assistance Program assists those earning up to 150% of the
poverty guidelines with the expenses of heating or cooling their residence. 183 The
National School Lunch Program provides the children of families earning up to 185%
of the poverty guidelines with either free lunches or meals not exceeding forty cents
per day. 184 Again, individuals with insufficient income to heat their homes or feed
their children are unlikely to have the necessary funds to hire an attorney.
There are federal and state programs that utilize multiples in excess of 185% of the
federal poverty guidelines. These programs, however, serve more specialized purposes
and assist a smaller number of individuals. For instance, most states set the income
threshold for the AIDS Drug Assistance Program at 300% or 400% of the federal
poverty guidelines. 185 While one could argue that the minimum definition of indigency
should be set closer to these higher percentages, such an argument would be tenuous.
By comparison to the Food Stamp Program (which assisted 19 million people in
2002) 186 and the National School Lunch Program (which provides meals to 26 million
children per day), 187 the Drug Assistance Program benefits a far smaller number of
individuals. Moreover, the exorbitant cost of prescription medication to treat HIV

181. See Northwest Justice Project, Help with Medicare Deductibles and Co-Payments
(on file with author).
182. See United States Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, Food
Stamp Program: Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.fns.usda.gov/fsp/faqs.htm (last
visited Apr. 3, 2005) [hereinafter USDA, Food Stamp Program].
183. See United States Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for
Children and Families, Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program Eligibility Guidelines, at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/liheap/eligible.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2005).
184. United States Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, National
School
Lunch
Program,
Program
Fact
Sheet,
at
http://www.frac.org/html/federal_food_programs/programs/nslp.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2005)
(“Children from families with incomes at or below 130 percent of the poverty level are eligible
for free meals. Those with incomes between 130 percent and 185 percent of the poverty level
are eligible for reduced-priced meals, for which students can be charged no more than 40
cents.”) [hereinafter USDA, National School Lunch Program].
185. The Access Project, AIDS Drug Assistance Programs, at
www.atdn.org/access/states (last modified July 16, 2004). Some states set the eligibility criteria
for this program as high as 500% or as low as 200% of the poverty guidelines. Id.
186. USDA, Food Stamp Program, supra note 182.
187. USDA, National School Lunch Program, supra note 184.
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demonstrates the need for the considerably higher multiple of the federal poverty
guidelines. 188
While it is difficult to assert that the minimum definition of indigency should be set
at 400% of the poverty guidelines, a reasonable case can be made that 200% is an
appropriate multiple. Food, health care and heat are basic life necessities that must be
procured before an individual can spend money on a lawyer. Federal agencies have
determined that those at or below 185% of the poverty guidelines are entitled to
assistance with these basic necessities. Put simply, if an individual at 185% of the
poverty guidelines cannot afford more than forty cents per day to provide his child
with a school lunch, then that individual likely cannot afford the significant up-front
retainer required to hire a lawyer. Accordingly, I conclude that the definition of
indigency should be set at 200% of the federal poverty guidelines, just above the
highest multiple of the mainstream federal assistance programs. Such an approach
guarantees that the truly poor are not being denied counsel, while at the same time
ensuring that states are not forced to unnecessarily subsidize those who could in fact
afford a lawyer.
c. A Flexible 200% Solution
The 200% solution is simply a rough estimate, not a perfectly crafted figure. As
such, it should not be set in stone. There may be circumstances where a defendant at
180% of the poverty guidelines reasonably could afford counsel. There may also be
situations where someone at 220% of the poverty guidelines would have no prospect
of retaining any private lawyer. Just as it has been counterproductive for the Court to
leave the states with unbridled discretion to determine indigency, it likewise would be
ill-advised for the Court to forbid the states from departing from the 200% solution. As
such, I recommend that the Court assert a flexible 200% solution—in essence, a
rebuttable presumption.
The Court’s experience in the punitive damages area is instructive. Over the last
two decades the Court has become concerned about unconstitutionally excessive
punitive damages awards, and it has imposed a constitutional ceiling on those
awards. 189 One factor the Court has considered in assessing constitutionality has been
the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages. After nearly fifteen years of struggling
with this factor, the Court seemed to reach resolution in 2003 when it explained that
“in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.” 190 In effect,
the Court set a flexible constitutional ceiling on punitive damages awards, whereby
most double-digit ratios would be considered unconstitutional but some might survive.

188. See Theresa Agovino, Experimental AIDS Drug Raises Treatment Hopes, Pricing
Fears, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 21, 2002 (discussing the effect of the high cost of medications
on the drug assistance programs).
189. See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance
Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 451, 453 (1993); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
The Court’s interest in this area can be traced to an article by Dean John Jeffries. See John
Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV.
139 (1986).
190. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
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The Court would be well served to adopt a similar approach with regard to the
minimum definition of indigency. The Court should advise the states that, “in practice,
few situations in which the defendant is below 200% of the poverty guidelines and not
appointed counsel will satisfy the Sixth Amendment.” This approach maintains some
flexibility for departure while making clear that in the typical case an individual below
200% of the poverty guidelines cannot afford to hire his own attorney.
CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court has decided dozens of Sixth Amendment cases
involving the indigent’s right to appointed counsel, it has never addressed what it
means to be indigent, and instead it has left the definition of indigency entirely in the
hands of the states. The states have not risen to the task, however, and in some cases
they have construed indigency so narrowly as to eviscerate the right to appointed
counsel. In order for the Supreme Court’s decision in Gideon v. Wainwright to remain
viable, there must be a constitutional floor for the definition of indigency. Although
Congress, as a fact-finding entity, would be well suited to defining indigency, elected
officials have little interest in diverting federal funds to guarantee the rights of criminal
defendants. As such, it falls to the Supreme Court to establish the constitutional floor.
Given the Court’s limited fact-finding skills, it should draw on the findings of federal
agencies that specialize in poverty programs. Because federal agencies assist
individuals earning up to 185% of the poverty guidelines with basic life necessities,
such as food, health care, and heat, the Court should recognize that individuals at those
income levels would be unable to hire a private attorney. The Court therefore should
set a flexible constitutional floor for the definition of indigency at 200% of the federal
poverty guidelines.

